The Hague conference began in 1996 with the “draft judgment”: the development of a convention on judicial competence and the recognition of judgments. Jurisdiction within such a convention would be divided into three categories: grounds of jurisdiction that are mandatory, optional or prohibited. Since negotiators were unable to reach consensus on such a convention, the scope of the work was limited to the competence and recognition of decisions based on a judicial agreement between the parties. During the negotiations, parallels were drawn between the New York Convention on Arbitration Awards: the aim was to create a system of recognition of decisions based on judicial proceedings in which the court was elected on the basis of a choice of judicial agreements, which would create the same level of predictability and application as in arbitration decisions in the states of the New York Convention. [3] A court in a contracting state other than that of the elected court suspends the proceedings: where an exclusive judicial agreement applies, unless they essentially reflect the category of high-risk insurance contracts established by EU law in Article 5, point (d), and Appendix A of the first non-life insurance directive (73/239/CE), as amended, which are provided for in the specific insurance jurisdiction in Section 3 of the Brussels-I Regulation (1215/2012), and for the purpose of choosing the law covered by Article 7 of the Rome I Regulation on the Law applicable to contractual obligations (593/2008) (cf. B.M McParland, Regulation Rome I (OUP 2015), “” (see point 13.122). 1. This agreement does not apply to the exclusive choice of judicial agreements – 1. In this agreement, “judgment” refers to any decision on a court`s reasoned benefits, regardless of its name, including an order or order, and the finding of costs or expenses by the court (including a court official) to the extent that the decision relates to a substantive decision that can be recognized or enforced under this convention. A provisional protection measure is not a judgment.
(2) For the purposes of this Convention, a natural or legal person, with the exception of a natural person, is considered to be resident in the state – for the purpose of possible ratification of the convention by the United States, it is also remarkable, from the point of view of the German parties, that recognition and enforcement under Article 11 of the HCCCA may also be denied if the judgment grants damages to a party that does not compensate for the loss or injury suffered. These include claims for punitive damages, often very high, which are allowed in the United States, which are incompatible with (German) public order under German law. In this regard, the explicit reference to the penal damages of Article 11 is therefore only a clarification. The German courts could also have refused, in the absence of this regulation, the recognition and enforcement of American judgments under Article 9 of the HCCCA because of their incompatibility with German public order. The ratification of the HCCCA by the United States (which has not yet taken place) is unlikely to have any consequences, not least because the United States is based on a U.S. initiative, including Article 11 and the HCCCA as such. And what about the “gap” for any choice of judicial agreements between “Exit Day” and the day the 2005 convention comes into force in the United Kingdom? Even according to the British government`s calculations, this would be 23 .m on 29 March to 1 April 2019. What would be the status of these agreements? A judgment of a court appointed in an exclusive court agreement must be recognized and applied in the other contracting states, in accordance with Article 8, paragraph 1, of the HCCCA.